State of Utah v. Todd Jeremy Little : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
State of Utah v. Todd Jeremy Little : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeremy M. Delicino; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Todd Jeremy Little, No. 20100885 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2588
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20100885-CA 
vs. 
TODD JEREMY LITTLE, Appellant is not incarcerated 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i), AND POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 8-3 7a-5( 1), IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. 
HADLEY, PRESIDING. 
Jeremy M. Delicino 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Marian Decker 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee FILED 
{ UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 2 9 2011 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20100885-CA 
vs. 
TODD JEREMY LITTLE, Appellant is not incarcerated 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i), AND POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l),INTHESECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SCOTT M. 
HADLEY, PRESIDING. . 
Jeremy M. Delicino 
10 West Broadway, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Marian Decker 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
THE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF MR. 
LITTLE'S ILLEGAL DETENTION AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
PURSUANT TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 2 
CONCLUSION 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . 11 
CASES CITED 
Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47 (1979) 3 
Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431 (1984) 7 
State v. Chism, 107 P.3d 706 (Utah 2005) 3 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d460 (Utah 1991) 7 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1991) 8 
State v. Toponotes. 76 P.3d 1159 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2003) 7 
State v. Vialpando, 89 P.3d 209 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 3 
State v. Worwood. 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007) 3, 8, 9 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 3, 4 
Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 8 
n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20100885-CA 
vs. 
TODD JEREMY LITTLE, Appellant is not incarcerated 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Todd Jeremy Little, ("Mr. Little"), was illegally detained when law 
enforcement seized him without reasonable articulable suspicion and then detained and 
questioned him for 20 minutes without any objective evidence of theft. For the first time, the 
State now claims that this Court may affirm on the basis that the detention bore no causal 
relationship to the discovery of the evidence in Mr. Little's truck. As discussed below, 
contrary to the State's position, the evidence found in Mr. Little's truck was the fruit of his 
unlawful detention, and this Court should therefore reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. 
Little's motion to suppress. 
1 
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ARGUMENT 
THE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF MR. 
LITTLE'S ILLEGAL DETENTION AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED PURSUANT TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Mr. Little was illegally seized when Officers Warren and Peterson continued to detain 
and question him after loss prevention informed the officers that they did not observe Mr. 
Little commit theft and the officers themselves did not have any objective evidence of theft. 
Further, the evidence observed in Mr. Little's truck was only discovered as a result of the 
fishing expedition that the officers embarked upon while Mr. Little was being illegally 
detained, and therefore should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. 
A. Mr. Little Was Unreasonably and Illegally Detained ] 
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, once Officers Warren and Peterson learned from loss prevention 
that Mr. Little did not take or conceal any merchandise, coupled with their unfruitful searches 
of both Mr. Little and Mr. Hodgson, any reasonable suspicion which may have existed at that 
point dissipated and Mr. Little was entitled to be released.2 Instead, since Officers Warren 
and Peterson continued to detain Mr. Little without evidence of criminal activity, the 
resulting 20-minute detention was unreasonable and thus illegal. 
1
 This brief summary of the illegal detention, argued in detail in Mr. Little's opening 
brief, is set forth in order to fully address the State's new contention that there is no 
causal relationship between the illegal detention and the discovery of the evidence. 
2
 Mr. Little maintains that there was not sufficient justification for the initial seizure. See 
Aplt Br. a t i :2r " " " " " " " " " " " 
2 
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An investigative detention is permissible only when officers "have reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). The reasonableness of an officer's actions in the 
context of an investigative detention requires a dual inquiry. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 
47, 1{ 25, 164 P.3d 397. Courts must first consider "whether the officer's actions was 
justified at its inception. Id (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Second, courts 
consider whether the length and scope of the detention are "'strictly tied to and justified by' 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Id "Investigative acts that are 
not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are 
permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not 
represent any further intrusion on the detainee's rights. State v. Chismu 2005 UT App 41, f^ 
15, 107 P.3d 706 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Indeed, "it is 
axiomatic that once the officer's suspicion has been alleviated the officer must allow the 
detainee to go on his way without further interference by the officer." State v. Vialpando, 89 
P.3d 209, 212 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
In this case, the continued detention of Mr. Little by Officers Warren and Peterson 
was not strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which may have rendered its 
initiation permissible. Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that loss prevention reported 
to the officers that no theft had occurred is a fact that warrants reversal of the trial court's 
ruling. This is especially tme since the officers themselves had no objective evidence of 
3 
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criminal activity as required by Terry. According to Officer Warren, loss prevention told him 
that "they didn't observe any of the suspects conceal anything and leave the store." R. 
171:17. He likely knew this before he escorted Mr. Little to the north doors and certainly 
once he arrived there: 
[ W]e got everyone together and had a powwow to discuss what had taken place. We 
turned to lost prevention . . . and they says, 'Well, they don't know what they're doing, 
but — they didn't take nothing 
R. 171:28. When questioned by the trial court on this fact, Officer Warren again confirmed 
that he knew from loss prevention that Mr. Little did not steal anything: 
Q. THE COURT: At that point had you been informed from dispatch, who was 
dealing with the lost prevention officer, that they did not observe Mr. Little 
steal anything? 
A. You know, I'm not sure if they advised it over the air for certain. Once we met 
over at the north doors, they did advise it there that, you know, they didn't 
actually see them conceal anything or steal anything. 
R. 171:34-35. Officer Peterson also knew from loss prevention officer, Mr. Leon, that Mr. 
Little had not stolen anything: "Q. At some point in that conversation does Mr. Leon inform 
you that the suspects had not attempted to steal any merchandise? A. Yes, sir." R. 171:58. 
He knew this prior to Mr. Little and Mr. Hodgson even exiting the store. R. 171:58. 
Further, the officers themselves did not observe or discover any evidence of a theft. 
When Mr. Little came out of the store Officer Warren didn't notice any bulges in his pockets. 
R. 171:18. Mr. Little was not carrying a backpack that may have concealed merchandise. R. 
1 71:34. Officer Warren patted him down and did not find any evidence of a theft. R. 
4 
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171:18-19,112-113. Indeed, Officer Warren testified that Mr. Little did not have anything 
concealed on his person. R. 171:28. Similarly, Officer Peterson searched Mr. Hodgson and 
did not find any evidence of theft. Contrary to the State's argument, it is not a reasonable 
inference that Mr. Little could have concealed something in the vehicle, since loss prevention 
was watching, tracking, and "continually following" the two of them the entire time and did 
not see any theft occur. R. 171:5, 16, 44. This conjecture, to the extent it is even supported 
in the evidence, did not justify the continued detention. 
The State argues that Mr. Little gave varying and inconsistent statements and that this 
justified the lengthy detention. Appellee Br. at 20-21. Any inconsistency, however, was 
manufactured by the officers through Mr. Little's illegal detention. Officers Warren and 
Peterson continued to question Mr. Little knowing that he had not stolen any merchandise. 
it was only during this questioning that the officers asked him how he arrived at the store. 
There was nothing inconsistent about his statement until Officer Jones arrived on the scene, 
sought out and interviewed Ms. Little, then came back and compared her statement with that 
from Mr. Little.3 Indeed, when Officer Jones arrived on scene, he was there on a fishing 
expedition in hopes that something might turn up: 
3
 The State's argument that this inconsistency heightened the officers' suspicion is 
especially unavailing since the officers themselves did not believe it was sufficient to 
justify Mr. Little's detention. Indeed, after illegally detaining Mr. Little for 20 minutes 
and with the inconsistency on how he arrived at the store, they believed there was 
insufficient evidence for further detention and told him he was free to leave. This 
statement, however, as argued in Mr. Little's opening brief, was meaningless at that point. 
tee"Aplt Br. a t 16^19. - - - - - - - -
5 
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Q. Were you requested to the scene after some time — after they had been there for 
some time? 
A. I wasn't requested to respond, no. I just responded over. 
Q. Okay. Did you just do this on your own volition, your own inclination? 
A. When I heard the off-- actually, I was busy with other calls, but when I heard 
the officers talking about more than one person involved inside of the store, 
they were watching opposite doors and stuff, I decided to go over there when 
I finished some other stuff to help out, just in case something happened. 
Q. Okay. When you amved, did you receive some information from the officers 
that were on scene? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What was that information? 
A. That there was a — there was two males they had made contact with, and they 
said there was another female that was possibly associated with the two males 
that may be involved with something. 
R. 171:76-77 (emphasis added). This vague statement from Officer Jones accurately sums 
up the amount of evidence that Officers Warren and Peterson had when they continued to 
detain and question Mr. Little. It is not: objective evidence of criminal activity based upon 
specific and articulable facts. Thus, at the time when Officer Jones arrived, reasonable 
suspicion had been dispelled. The subsequent inconsistency of how Mr. Little amved at the 
store, an inconsistency which was irrelevant to whether he stole merchandise, did not heighten 
or justify the continued detention of Mr. Little. 
Ultimately, Mr. Little was not being detained in order for the officers to determine 
whether a theft had occurred. They knew from loss prevention that nothing had been taken. 
They knew this either prior to the suspects exiting the store or shortly thereafter. They knew 
from their searches of both suspects that nothing was concealed or stolen. And they never 
evenbothered to determine whether -anything had been taken from the television. Indeed, 
6 
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once loss prevention informed the officers that they did not observe any theft, and law 
enforcement themselves did not have any objective evidence of theft, any conceivable 
reasonable suspicion ended at that point and Mr. Little should have been free to go. 
B. The Evidence in Mr. Little's Vehicle was Discovered as a Result of the 
Officers Exploitation his Illegal Detention. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the evidence in Mr. Little's truck was obtained as a 
result of his illegal detention and therefore should be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary 
rule. The exclusionary rule both under the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution "prohibits the use at trial of evidence, both primary and derivative (the c fruit of 
unlawful police conduct'), obtained in violation of an individual's constitutional and statutory 
rights." State v. Toponotes, 2003 UT 30, f 13,76 P.3d 1159 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431 ^  442-43, (1984)); see also State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1991) (plurality 
opinion) ("We now expressly hold that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary 
consequence of police violations of article I, section 14."). Furthermore, the State's argument 
fails to recognize that not only will primary and derivative evidence be suppressed, but also 
that evidence which is obtained as the result of the exploitation of an unreasonable detention. 
Indeed, "[t]he exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence obtained directly as a result of 
the illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the illegality, unless the 
evidence was obtained by means 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
7 
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taint/"State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 786 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 
47U 488 (1963)).4 
In the case of State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397, the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the argument the State has set forth in the case sub judice. Id f 45. In Worwood, 
evidence was obtained after law enforcement conducted a de facto arrest without probable 
cause when the officer transported Worwood to a different location to conduct the field 
sobriety tests. I d ^ j 27-33. Just as in this case, the State attempted to argue that the illegal 
detention was not the but for cause of the administration of the field sobriety tests. Id <f[ 45. 
In other words, the State argued that regardless of whether Worwood was illegally detained, 
the officer would have administered the field sobriety tests anyway and therefore there was 
no causal link between the unlawful detention and results of these tests. I d This position was 
rejected: 
. . . Worwoods illegal detention was the but-for cause of Officer Kevin 
Wright's administration of the field sobriety tests at Wright's home. There was 
no intervening event to break the causal chain. The fact that before the 
illegality reasonable suspicion would have justified further investigation does 
not break the actual linkages between the illegal detention and the field 
sobriety tests. Investigations under reasonable suspicion do not have a shelf 
life, unlike a transportable warrant. An officer must either confirm the 
suspicion by establishing probable cause for arrest or dispel the suspicion and 
release the suspect. Wright took neither constitutional path. Instead, he not 
only exploited the illegality in order to obtain the evidence needed for probable 
4
 The State has not argued any exception to the exclusionary rule. In fact, the State 
affirmatively stated that this Court need not even address whether Mr. Little's purported 
consent attenuated the illegal detention from the discovery of the evidence in his pickup 
since the State did not rely on that theory below and does not do so on appeal. See 
Appellee Br. at 25 n. 4. ~ ~ ~ 
8 
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cause, he arguably created the illegality in order to obtain the evidence without 
conducting the arrest himself. The field sobriety tests would not have been 
obtained absent the illegality or different choices by Wright. 
fd. ]^ 47. Thus, the court concluded there was a causal connection since "[a]bsent the 
i 1 legality, Wright may have conducted the field sobriety tests on the roadside, but he may have 
just as likely released Worwood to avoid the trouble of making an off-duty arrest." Id. f^ 49. 
In this case, the evidence seized from Mr. Little's truck was derived from the police 
misconduct since it never would have been discovered but for the illegal detention. As 
discussed above, Mr. Little was illegally detained as soon as the officers knew from loss 
prevention that Mr. Little did not commit a theft coupled with their lack of objective evidence 
of theft. This occurred almost immediately after Mr. Little left the store. Had Mr. Little been 
released instead of illegally detained and questioned he would have been free to get in his 
truck and leave. Instead, the officers continued to detain and question him on how he arrived 
at the store in their 20 minute attempt to create a reason for further detention. 
Just as in Worwood, the officers in this case exploited Mr. Little's illegal detention 
when Jones arrived and sought out Ms. Little. It was only from Ms. Little that Officer Jones 
learned that Mr. Little drove to the store, and the specific information that Mr. Little was 
driving a white truck. Indeed, only as a result of the illegal detention did the officers form 
a reason to search for Mr. Little's vehicle. Had Mr. Little been released prior to this 
continued detention and questioning he would have been free to get in his car and leave. 
9 
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Simply put, the drug evidence would not have been obtained absent the illegality or different 
choices by Officers Warren, Peterson, and Jones. These officers exploited the illegality in 
order to manufacture some evidence to justify a basis for further detention. The evidence 
found in Mr. Little's truck is, therefore, the logical fruit of the unreasonable detention. The 
State's argument that Mr. Little's detention bore no causal relation to either the discovery of 
the pickup or the drug evidence is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Officers Warren, Peterson and Jones conducted an unconstitutionally 
expansive investigatory detention of Mr. Little. The inculpatory evidence obtained from Mr. 
Little's vehicle was the result of this illegal detention and should have been suppressed. 
Accordingly, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Little's motion to 
suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on "t> December, 2011. 
JEREMY M. DELICINO 
Attorney/for Appellant Todd Little 
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